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Introduction
This article studies the history of financial economics during the 1960s. This decade was crucial in the construction of this discipline: although works in financial economics had existed since the mid-19th century –see volume 1–, this discipline was only included into the scientific field during these years. Bourdieu defines the concept of scientific field as follows:
“In analytical terms, a field can be defined as a network, or a configuration of objective relationships between positions. These positions are objectively defined in their existence and in the determination they impose on their occupants, agents or institutions, by their current and potential situation in the structure of the distribution of various kinds of power (or capital), the possession of which demands the access of the specific profits at stake in the field, and, as a consequence, by their objective relations to the other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.)” (Bourdieu, et al. 1992, 73).
Scientific field includes all scientific disciplines. Each scientific discipline constitutes a sub-field and imposes its own rules, behaviors, methods, etc. to distinguish itself from approaches recognized as non scientific. Relying on Gingras, within the development of a scientific field, Bourdieu (2004, 50) identifies two steps: “first, the emergence of a research practice, in other words, agents whose practice is based more on research than on teaching, and the institutionalization of research in universities through the creation of conditions conducive to the production of knowledge and the long-term reproduction of the group; and, secondly, the constitution of a group recognized as socially distinct and a social identity, either disciplinary, through the creation of scientific associations, or professional, with the creation of a corporation –the scientists provide themselves with official representatives to give them social visibility and defend their interest”.
The scientific field concept helps to better understand financial economics and its creation. Here, we will focus on one particular point: financial economics became a scientific sub-field in consequence of the theoretical explanations given to empirical and statistical results accumulated during several decades. Indeed, following Bourdieu (1975, 96), “we have to distinguish the [author] who has discovered the unknown phenomenon from the one who made it a new scientific fact integrating it in a theoretical construction” of a scientific discipline, which accordingly places it within the scientific field. For instance, during the 1960s, the random character of stock market prices became a scientific fact about 100 years after its discovery by Jules Regnault in 1863. It is precisely during the 1960s that several discoveries by financial economists became scientific facts.
The integration of financial economics into the scientific field was made possible by the synthesis of results. These results belong to three analytical components that were developed successively: financial econometrics, modern theory of probability and economic equilibrium. Efficient market theory, CAPM and Modigliani-Miller theorems played a key role in this synthesis, and therefore in the rise of the new scientific discipline. They established links between, on the one hand, empirical and mathematical results in finance, and on the other hand, economic equilibrium. These links led to the creation of theoretical explanations for empirical results, explanations that were the last step in the categorization of financial economics as a science.  
This article aims to show how these works structured the new scientific discipline. The format of this article is as follows. Part 1 examines features that show the incorporation of this new discipline into the scientific field during the 1960s. Part 2 analyzes the contribution of Modigliani-Miller’s article, CAPM and Efficient market theory in the construction of financial economics. It shows the key role of the economic equilibrium in the creation of financial economics.

I. The rise of the financial economics

Before the 1960s, works in financial economics were very marginal in the scientific field. Milton Friedman’s reaction against Harry Markowitz’s thesis gives a good illustration. This thesis, defended in 1952, deals with the theory of portfolio selection. It is one of the first Anglo-Saxon works in what it is now called financial economics that was not exclusively empirical. Indeed, at that time, financial economics works mainly investigated empirically the random character of stock market prices. In the defense, Friedman declared: “Harry, I don’t see anything wrong with the math here, but I have a problem. This isn’t a dissertation in economics, and we can’t give you a Ph.D. in economics for a dissertation that’s not economics. It’s not math, it’s not economics, it’s not even business administration” (in Bernstein 1992, 60).
While Friedman’s reaction could be considered inappropriate or excessive, given the importance of Markowitz’s work today, it is a good signal about the situation of financial economics before the 1960s, and more specifically before Modigliani and Miller’s contribution in 1958: the few existing works did not constitute either an academic or a scientific discipline yet; there were applied mathematics and empirical investigations without theoretical contribution that took place in a scientific or an academic discipline that already existed. This situation changed with the creation and the organization of a new community during the 1960s. In other words, Markowitz’s article took place in a transitional period that ended with Modigliani and Miller’s publication on “the cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment” in 1958. 

I.1. 1945-1958: a transitional period

After WWII, authors had access to new mathematical tools from modern theory of probability. As I mentioned in the introduction, the construction of the financial economics cannot be separated from this theoretical corpus. The modern theory of probability led several authors to take into account uncertainty, in particular after Arrow-Debreu’s works. However, until the 1960s, modern theory of probability was used to study financial market and corporate finance in only one way: academics exploited the properties of random variables in applying them to long existing problems; they did not provide any new theoretical investigations. We can show that this situation is true for the analysis of stock price changes as well as for portfolio management theory.
The analysis of stock market prices was relatively recent in North America during the 1950s and it was exclusively developed through financial econometrics (see Jovanovic (2004)). The latter started to develop during the 1930s when, in September 9th 1932, Alfred Cowles established the Cowles Commission. “Victim” of the crash of 1929, Cowles “realized that he did not understand the workings of the economy, and so in 1931 he stopped publishing his market advisory letter, and began research on stock market forecasting” (Christ 1994, 30). His quest led him to get in touch with the young Econometric Society, which he sponsored. Two authors, linked to the Cowles Commission, started, in the United States, the researches in quantitative finance: Alfred Cowles (1933, 1944) and Holbrook Working (1934, 1949) who participated to its summer conferences. Because the 1929 crash had not been forecasted, they considered that price changes were unpredictable. It is by this mean that the random walk model was reintroduced to represent price changes, independently of the works of its two first contributors, Jules Regnault and Louis Bachelier. The main specificity of these new researches is the application of new tools, which were provided by econometrics. This situation still existed until the 1960s. Thus, in 1953, when Maurice Kendall published a statistical study on the random price fluctuations, he adopted the same approach: he applied new developments in econometrics and in modern theory of probability to financial problems. Neither Kendall, nor Cowles, nor Working provided theoretical explanation at that time. This situation was similar for portfolio management theory, the other field in financial economics that existed in the 1950s.
Markowitz (1952) treats single-period returns for various securities as random variables, and assigns them expected values, standard deviations and correlations. From this, he suggests the possibility to calculate the expected return and volatility of any portfolio constructed with those securities: volatility and expected return are to be treated as proxies for risk and reward. Out of the entire universe of possible portfolios, certain ones will optimally balance risk and reward: this is Markowitz’s efficient frontier of portfolios on which an investor should select his portfolio. The core of Markowitz’s idea consisted on using mathematical properties of random variables to show that shares diversification from a portfolio could reduce the variability of returns: the expected value of a weighted sum is the weighted sum of the expected values, while the variance of a weighted sum is not the weighted sum of the variances. Markowitz did not give any theoretical demonstration to his mathematical result; he just operated a financial window-dressing of some mathematical properties. More precisely, he applied these properties to an old question which had been already analyzed by several authors. We can mention, in particular, Marshall Ketchum, a professor at the University of Chicago, from who Markowitz received advertising when he started his Ph.D. In his 1947 article, Ketchum had suggested that one way to protect investments from downward fluctuation in stock prices was to divide portfolio in two parts: a defensive part based on low volatility securities and an offensive part based on high volatility securities (Stabile 2005, 133-6). This proposition was a direct response against the unpredictability of price changes that was debated at that time.
Obviously, this kind of works, which used modern theory of probability, stayed marginal until the diffusion of the teaching and use of this theory at the beginning of the 1960s. Indeed, before the 1960s, hardly any economist and financier used stochastic processes, because they were not well understood and they were not greatly diffused. Effectively, the modern theory of probability, which mainly comes from Kolmogorov’s work, was truly accepted in the 1950s by the new generation of mathematicians –Mazliak (2003), Chaumont et al. (2004). Even during the 1960s, few economists or financiers used them. For instance, Samuelson (1965a, 1965b), who was the first with Mandelbrot (1966) to substitute the martingale model​[1]​ for the random walk model/Brownian Motion to represent stock price variations, needed the help of a mathematician to make his mathematical demonstration (Samuelson 1965b). The use of the theory of modern probability, in particular through the conception of uncertainty, offered new perspectives on already existing problems. At that time, however, such developments were technical and any theoretical explanation did not exist. In other words, during this period the modern theory of probability provided new tools that social sciences could exploit, but, obviously, this is not enough to build a new discipline: a model does not contain causalities per se, because the choice between endogenous variables and exogenous variables comes from theoretical frameworks. Indeed, a theory gives causalities that allow defining the structure of the model. These new tools from modern theory of probability cannot provide an explanation to the empirical environment. Therefore, theoretical frameworks are necessary to introduce financial economics into the scientific field. Financial economists naturally quickly focus on the lack of theoretical explanations. 

I.2. The lack of theoretical explanation before the 1960s

Before the 1960s, no theory was explaining the new results in portfolio selection or in the random character of stock market prices. This crucial point illustrates what kept financial economics from becoming a scientific discipline. This absence characterizes all existing works written during that transitional period.
Concerning portfolio selection, Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952) provided no real theoretical explanation to justify mathematical results. I explain that Markowitz applied new mathematics to an old problem. Of course, because he used results from modern theory of probability –mean-variance model of portfolio choice–, he offered new perspectives, but the major point is that he did not provide any theoretical explanation except a mathematical lecture. It was exactly the problem pointed out by Friedman. Markowitz corrected it by publishing his book in 1959. Here, he started to give theoretical interpretation of some of his previous result: he strove to link his mean-variance criterion with the maximization of the expected utility of wealth. This theoretical link helps to include his results and works in academic and theoretical questions debated in economics. As we will see below, this link with economics was completed with the CAPM during the 1960s. Therefore, before that book, no theoretical explanation was made about that subject.
In the same way, Cowles (1933), Working (1934) or Kendall (1953) did not create any theoretical explanation about the random character of stock market prices. More precisely, the enthusiasm for the new econometric practices developed since the 1930s clouded the research for theoretical explanations of the random character of stock prices. The theoreticians pointed out the absence of theoretical explanation during the 1950s. This is particularly striking after the Koopmans-Vining debate at the end the 1940s, which set NBER against Cowles Commission over the lack of theoretical explanation and the necessity to link measurement with theory. This debate dealt with the kind of analysis to practice on statistical data. The NBER was claiming the usefulness of a mainly statistical approach which aimed at measuring the evolutions of economic indices, while the Cowles Commission, since the beginning of the 1950s, gave less importance to econometric methods as such and became more oriented toward economic theory to construct theoretical foundations. This transition is illustrated by the new slogan of the Cowles Commission: from Science is Measurement, it became Theory and Measurement. 
Kendall published his article just after the Koopmans-Vining controversy. This study was accepted with interest even as its economic contribution was harshly criticized. The most important critique was the absence of links with economic theories or concepts: “It may therefore be concluded that Professor Kendall’s investigations of auto-correlations cannot in principle throw any light on the possibility of estimating the kind of dynamic economic relationships in which economists are usually interested” (Prais 1953, 29). Houthakker, who joined the Cowles Commission in 1952, also explained that “the evaluation of Professor Kendall’s paper […] is made difficult by the fact that there is no reference to a theoretical framework anywhere, nor indeed to work of others which the author may have had in mind” (1953, 32). About a technical sentence of Kendall, he added that “this sentence would be correct if it began by the following sentence: "it was customary twenty or thirty years ago"” (1953, 32). These remarks are direct echoes to the Koopmans-Vining debate. 
This evolution in economics had a direct influence on the two main defenders of the random character of prices at that time, Working (1956, 1958, 1961) and Roberts (1959), who also consistently highlighted the absence of theoretical explanation and the weakness of the statistical results.  The lack of theoretical explanation was one of the main challenges since the end of the 1950s.

I.3. The rise of a new scientific community

This challenge gained the support of a new scientific community. Three features show the emergence of this community during the 1960s: 1) news academics and researchers appeared; 2) new scientific publications existed; 3) a new field of investigation was defined.
First, we can notice that at the beginning of the 1960s, a new generation of economists started their graduate studies and contributed to the creation of financial economics. This generation contributed to the creation of a community in financial economics. Most of these new students were graduated from the University of Chicago and MIT. In fact, most of academics who studied financial markets with this new mathematics worked in these 2 places, which produced the main research and results in the discipline during the 1960s and the 1970s.
At the University of Chicago, research was made at the Graduate School of Business where Harry Roberts worked with James Lorie and Lawrence Fisher. In 1960, the latter two professors started an ambitious 4-year program of research on security prices (Lorie 1965, 3). Lorie was recruited in 1951 at Chicago to revitalize the Graduate School of Business. “The result was a tremendous change in the school’s fortune –in faculty and students head count, and in the increasing eminence of the school. The University of Chicago consistently rates in the top five business schools in the United States and among the top ten internationally. In the past 25 years, the University of Chicago has won or shared eight Nobel prizes in economics –five of them by scholars affiliated with the Business School– versus one for all other business schools combined” (Niederhoffer 1997, 264). In fact, a large part of the main founders of the current financial economics comes precisely from this Graduate School of Business. Lorie and Fisher created the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), which had an important group of Ph.D. students –such as Eugene Fama, Benjamin King and Arnold Moore– and benefited from a large financial aid from a financial pool. This centre had the support of one of the first academic computers to compile statistical data. This centre aimed to produce statistical data on stock prices and to analyze price movements and returns. Merton Miller joined them one year later, in 1961​[2]​. The CRSP gave the opportunity to test the random character of stock market prices as well as portfolio management.
	At the same time, MIT opened a new area of research on this topic with Sidney Alexander, Paul Cootner, Dick Eckaus, Hendrik Houthakker (visiting professor), Ed Kuhn, Paul Samuelson, and several students, including Walter Barney, John Bauer, Sidney Levine, William Steiger and Richard Kruizenga. During the 1960s, Cootner supervised more than 20 theses in financial economics and became an essential figure of the development of this discipline at MIT. Researches rose in other universities during the same period, e.g. Columbia, Washington or Los Angeles, but they had a lesser influence.
The second point concerns scientific publications. The creation of a new scientific community requires that its new members share common tools, references and problems. This was precisely the role of textbooks, seminars and scientific journals. Those in financial economics were developed from the beginning of the 1960s with the arrival of this new generation of students. It is well known that the American Finance Association and its journal, the Journal of finance, already existed at that time. They were however not concerned by financial economics before the 1960s. Created in 1940, this association suspended its activities during World War II. Its works were revived in 1946 with the creation of the Journal of Finance. However, articles dealt with problems directly linked with the war and post war difficulties, and none of them were concerned with financial economics. It is only in 1949 that the Journal of Finance published an article that dealt with financial markets; and only at the end of the 1950s that these articles began to drop the traditional approach, which was mainly descriptive and did not use the new mathematics. Articles became oriented more towards mathematics and modeling, and specialized in financial economics. This approach was also shared by the Journal of Business, the other major academic publication that dealt with finance. For this reason, Stabile (2005, 143) explains that at the time “statistical methods for analyzing the stock market had not yet made in into the mainstream of economics”. 
In fact, it was in the 1960s that seminars, textbooks and scientific journals started to develop in financial economics. MIT and the CRSP organized several seminars. For instance, the CRSP had bi-annual seminars, which “were already famous meeting grounds where practitioners (whose firms sponsored the Center) gathered to hear the latest academic research before it became public” (Mehrling 2004, chap. 2). There was also the Quadrangle Club in Chicago where Sharpe was invited to present his ideas in 1961 in front of Miller, Lorie and Fama (Bernstein 1992, 193). In addition, these groups had the support of scientific journals specialized in financial economics, such as the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, created in 1965 by the Graduate School of Business Administration of the University of Washington, the Journal of Business, published by the University of Chicago, and the Journal of Finance. Although older, the last two journals changed their editorial policy during this period and choose articles more oriented towards mathematics and modeling –see Bernstein (1992, 41-4 and 129). Moreover, these revues published several special issues to present the new orientation and results. In 1966, the Journal of Business published a special issue on “Recent quantitative and formal research on the stock market”. It was the means to take stock of the CRSP’s researches for the first time. The omnipresence of the hypothesis relative to the random character of stock prices variations can be noticed. In 1968, three years after its creation, the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis also published a special issue, which dealt with the application of the random walk model to stock prices changes. 
Finally, it was also during the 1960s that textbooks and collected articles started to be published​[3]​. These publications also helped to define and stabilize a shared culture for the members of this new community. These two kinds of publications provide an indication about the evolution of the discipline, in particular the diversification of the subjects analyzed. Articles are generally published first, and then collected articles and finally textbooks. During the 1960s, collected articles in financial economics were published about 5 years before textbooks on the same subjects. During the first part of this decade, following the publication of Markowitz’s book in 1959, the publications of collected articles focused on portfolio selection. It was only at the end of the 1960s that textbooks on this subject were published. During the second part of the 1960s, there was a diversification of subjects, which started to structure the discipline. In addition to portfolio selection, subjects dealt with the nature of stock price movements, the investment returns, the market efficiency and the CAPM –Capital Asset Pricing Model. However, textbooks on these subjects only started to be published during the 1970s. Among these new collected articles, there is The Random Character of Stock Market Prices edited in 1964 by Paul Cootner. This book constitutes the first anthology of articles that analyze random stock price movements. It has an important place in the history of financial economics for three reasons. First it contributed enormously to the diffusion of the random walk model and its interpretation. Second, it sketched a research program for the future that was largely followed. This program had two directions. The first one concerned the random walk model and its empirical tests. The second direction dealt with the analysis of option prices, for which the random walk model constitutes a fundamental hypothesis for such an analysis​[4]​. Third, this book provided the first presentation of historical data relative to financial economics.
The third feature deals with the definition of a new field of investigation. Inclusion into the scientific field was not inevitable. Consequently, to fill a new domain of research and to justify the usefulness of their new approach, academics had to adopt a strategy to differentiate from previous approaches. This kind of opposition was illustrated by articles that dealt with stock price variations. Academics chose to open several debates between their new approach, mainly based on mathematical models and tools –in particular the random walk model–, and previous approaches that studied stock prices changes, in particular Chartism and business cycles –as those defended at the NBER. These debates generally took place in specialized journals and newspapers, such as Business Week or the Financial Analysts Journal, in which academics popularized their results and opposed them to professional practices. To justify the new approach, academics used a Manichean presentation of each approach. For instance, Cootner introduced one work by saying that:
“these academic studies have proven to be more skeptical about the folklore of the market place than those of the professional practitioners. To several of the authors represented in this volume the "patterns" described by some market analysis are mere superstitions. […] it is hard to find a practitioner, no matter how sophisticated, who does not believe that by looking at the past history of prices one can learn something about their prospective behavior, while it is almost as difficult to find an academician who believes that such a backward look is of any substantial value. The essays in this book are exclusively of the academic type” (1964, 1-2).
As other defenders of the random walk model and the new ideas, Fama (1965, 59) presented his results as a challenge to practitioners, who had to justify the usefulness of their practice:
“In sum the theory of random walks in stock-market prices presents important challenges to both the chartist and the proponent of fundamental analysis. For the chartist, the challenge is straightforward. If the random-walk model is a valid description of reality, the work of the chartist, like that of the astrologer, is of no real value in stock-market analysis. The empirical evidence to date provides strong support for the random-walk model. In this light the only way the chartist can vindicate his position is to show that he can consistently use his techniques to make better-than-chance predictions of stock prices. It is not enough for him to talk mystically about patterns that he sees in the data. He must show that he can consistently use these patterns to make meaningful predictions of future prices” (1965, 59).
Hoffland’s article also gives a good summary of the presentation at this time:
“Folklore is a body of knowledge incorporating the superstitions, beliefs and practices of the unsophisticated portion of a society […]. Folklore is distinguished from scientific knowledge by its lack of rigor […]. The Dow theory is often used as an example of a crudely formulated stock market "theory"” (1967, 85).
As we see, the most important argument was the scientific claim: new academics argued that their approach was based on scientific criteria, while Chartism would be based on folklore and would have no scientific foundation. Financial economics was supposed to drill above and beyond previous folkloric practices, and the random walk model was presented as the uniquely available scientific analysis of the character of stock price changes. The vocabulary used was intentionally clear-cut to convince the reader: “scientific”, “folklore” or “challenge”. In addition, academics chose to call the new discipline modern financial theory to insist on its novelty, and they often underlined that only scientific tests can separate the folklore from their scientific approach. Chartists and professionals were not the only targets. Many authors used the publication of textbooks as opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with textbooks available before, especially because their lack of analytical content and their heavy emphasis on descriptive material. After the 1960s, once financial economics was permanently embedded into the scientific field, these debates disappeared: they lost their significance, because the scientific community and many financiers permanently recognized and adopted financial economics.
These new seminars and publications contributed to the creation of a truly homogenous community, which shared common problems, tools and language, scientific journals and courses in universities. The use of the theory of modern probability, in particular through the conception of uncertainty, offered new perspectives on already existing problems. At that time, however, such developments were technical and any theoretical explanation did not exist. In other words, during this period the modern theory of probability provided new tools that social sciences could exploit, but, obviously, this is not enough to build a new discipline: a model does not contain causalities per se, because the choice between endogenous variables and exogenous variables comes from theoretical frameworks. Indeed, a theory gives causalities that allow defining the structure of the model. These new tools from modern theory of probability cannot provide an explanation to the empirical environment. Therefore, theoretical frameworks are necessary to introduce financial economics into the scientific field. More precisely, it was necessary to link the new approach with an existing science or with the criteria of conventional acceptance​[5]​ of that time. The use of the contemporaneous scientific method –the tests and the hypothetico-deductive method– already constituted an important link. However, during the 1960s, the crucial step for the creation of the financial economics was the construction of theoretical explanations based on concepts from economics.
Finally, during the 1950s and the 1960s, the main features of financial economics were set: 1) there is an academic community with students; 2) financial econometrics was more and more used; 3) modern theory of probability provided new tools to analyze old problems; 4) and more crucial, theoretical explanations started to emerge. The second part will focus on that last point: Modigliani and Miller’s article, CAPM and Efficient market theory had set the theoretical bases of financial economics that allowed the creation of this discipline.

II. The links with economics: the specific place of Modigliani and Miller’s theorem and the CAPM.

This problem of the lack of theoretical explanation was closed since 1958. New tools, new models, new researchers and students were existing yet; and the last step was the construction of a theoretical corpus that can be recognized as scientific. This last step was allowed thanks to economics, which was already accepted as a scientific, as well as academic, discipline. Here, Modigliani and Miller’s article, CAPM and Efficient market theory played a key role in the creation of financial economics. By linking empirical results and new mathematical results with economic equilibrium, these works gave the first theoretical contents to the new discipline.

II.1. Modigliani and Miller’s article

Modigliani and Miller (1958) used stochastic processes, developed thanks to the modern theory of probability, to analyze the old problem of capital structure of the value of the firm. Their main theorem states the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. It can actually be thought of as an extension of the "separation theorem" originally developed by Irving Fisher (1930)​[6]​. Modigliani-Miller extended this proposition thanks to the arbitrage argument. They assume there are two otherwise identical firms (that is, with the same total future cash flows from assets), one unlevered and one not. They then show that if the sum of the current values of the stock and bonds of the levered firm were not equal to the current value of the stock of the unlevered firm, there would be an arbitrage opportunity. Consequently, arbitrage enforces that the value of the firms to be identical, whatever the composition of the firm's financial structure.
According to the construction of financial economics, the most important contribution of Modigliani and Miller’s article is not to be found in its result about financial structure, but the use of an “arbitrage proof” for their demonstration. Although Modigliani and Miller were not the first to apply arbitrage proof in finance (Rubinstein 2003), their article allowed to popularize it for 2 reasons: 1) their article is one of the firsts to use modern theory of probability to analyze a financial problem –i.e. it is embedded into the theoretical mainstream of the time–; 2) these authors had a strong academic anchorage because they made their research at MIT and at the University of Chicago, the two major universities that developed financial economics at that time. Following this publication, financial economists have used arbitrage arguments to examine a variety of other issues involving asset pricing (Efficient market theory, Black and Scholes model, etc.). It can be noticed that one of the major advances in financial economics since the 1960s has been the clarification and the formalization of the exact meaning of “no arbitrage”. Many important results of financial economics are based squarely on the hypothesis of no arbitrage, and it serves as one of the most basic unifying principles of study of financial markets. Moreover, the arbitrage proof is an extension of the economic law of one price in perfect capital market: the forces of competition will ensure that any given commodity will be sold at the same price. By this way, Modigliani and Miller’s demonstration is an implication of equilibrium in perfect capital market, which provides a direct link with economic equilibrium. Therefore, Modigliani and Miller’s article created a first link between economics and financial results.

II. 2. CAPM

The CAPM –Capital Asset Pricing Model– is directly concerned with the equilibrium of financial markets. It allowed including Markowitz and Roy’s portfolio selection model into the scientific field. It was developed by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), a Markowitz’s Ph.D. student, Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The CAPM extended Markowitz's portfolio theory to introduce the notions of systematic and specific risk. In fact, in 1958, James Tobin expanded on Markowitz's work by adding a risk-free asset to the analysis. This made it possible to leverage or deleverage portfolios on the efficient frontier. Tobin introduced the notions of a super-efficient portfolio and the capital market line. Through leverage, portfolios on the capital market line are able to outperform portfolio on the efficient frontier. The CAPM proves that Tobin's super-efficient portfolio must be the market portfolio. All investors will hold the market portfolio, leveraging or de-leveraging it with positions in the risk-free asset in order to achieve a desired level of risk. The CAPM decomposes a portfolio's risk into systematic and specific risk. Systematic risk is the risk of holding the market portfolio. As the market movements, each individual asset is more or less affected. To the extent that any asset participates in such general market movements, that asset entails systematic risk. Specific risk is the risk which is unique to an individual asset. It represents the component of an asset's return which is uncorrelated with general market movements. According to the CAPM, the marketplace compensates investors for taking systematic risk but not for taking specific risk. This is because specific risk can be diversified away. When an investor holds the market portfolio, each individual asset in that portfolio entails specific risk, but through diversification, the investor's net exposure is just the systematic risk of the market portfolio. Systematic risk can be measured using beta. According to CAPM, the expected return of a stock equals the risk-free rate plus the portfolio's beta multiplied by the expected excess return of the market portfolio.

The CAPM is built using an approach familiar to economists for three reasons. First, one assumes some sort of maximizing behavior on the part of participants in a market; second one investigates the equilibrium conditions under which such markets will clear; third, markets are perfect. While the CAPM is based on unreasonable hypothesis for practice, it has a theoretical value: it gave the standard finance paradigm for market equilibrium under uncertainty.

II.3. The links with economics through the construction of efficient market theory

The last theory that was built during the 1960s and that linked financial econometrics results with economics is the efficient market theory. With their recognition of the absence of theoretical explanation for the random walk model, Working (1956, 1958, 1961) and Roberts (1959) were also the firsts to make links with the economic theories in order to give theoretical foundations to the random walk character of stock price fluctuations. They made it through the arbitrage proof and proprieties of economic equilibrium.
Roberts suggested linking the random character of stock price with the absence of profit: “if the stock market behaved like a mechanically imperfect roulette wheel, people would notice the imperfections and by acting on them, remove them” (1959, 7). Here Robert used the “arbitrage proof” argument, updated by Modigliani and Miller’s article. In his 1960 article, Cowles (1960, 914-5) makes a first reference to a competitive market and uses the demonstration by no arbitrage opportunity. This article constitutes the beginning of a connection with the standard economic theory that progressively led to elaborate the efficient market theory. Two years later, Cootner (Cootner 1962, 25) suggested the idea of the efficient market theory, although he did not use the expression. This suggestion to link the random walk model, information, and the economic equilibrium was used, and then diffused, by several students of Cootner. It also interested researchers at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, most notably a young graduate student, Eugene Fama. In his Ph.D. thesis, defended in 1964 and published the next year in the Journal of Business, Fama synthesized empirical work and gave his first formulation of the efficient market theory: 
“An "efficient" market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value” (1965, 56).
This kind of market is characterized by the equalization between the price of a security and its equilibrium value –i.e. the intrinsic value. The major point is that price is equal to the value of the security, which is determined by using the whole information. In his 1970 article, Fama formulated the definition of the efficient market that is generally used: “a market in which prices always "fully reflect" available information is called "efficient"” (1970, 383).
According to efficient market theory, if the model of equilibrium does not use all available information to evaluate the value of the security, it will be possible to make an arbitrage. Thus, on an efficient market, the equalization between the price and the equilibrium value means that all available information is included in the price. Consequently, it is not possible to use past information to predict the future changes of the prices: present and future prices are independent from the past prices. For this reason, in an efficient market, stock price changes must be as random as the arrival of new information. In other words, according to this theory, the random walk model can simulate the dynamic evolution of equilibrium prices in a competitive market. As a result of this link with economic equilibrium, the efficient market hypothesis allowed the introduction of financial economics into the scientific field.
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^1	  A sequence of random variables Pt adapted to () is called a martingale if . This means that the better estimation of the security’s price at the time t+1, Pt+1 with the available information at the time t, Φt, that we can do at the time  t is the security’s price at the time t, Pt. Thus the expected profit, y, between two periods, considering the available information at the time t, Φt, is zero.
^2	  This center was also managed by Fisher Black, whose successor was Myron Scholes. Both elaborated the pricing options model, which was published in 1973. 
^3	  For instance, Cootner (1964), Fredrikson (1965), Wu and Zakon (1965), Fredrikson (1971) or Lorie and Brealey (1972) published collected articles, while Moore (1968), Mao (1969) or Jean (1970) published textbooks.
^4	  It is known that, during the 1960s, the analysis of options gained an important interest.
^5	  I consider that the acceptance of a theory or a theoretical model does not only depend on empirical validation; there are also the criteria of conventional acceptance. The conventional acceptance concerns the conventions –postulates, beliefs, etc.– that a theory (or a model) must respect in order to be accepted as a scientific result of a discipline.
^6	  Fisher had argued that with efficient capital markets, the production decision of an entrepreneur-owned firm ought to be independent of the intertemporal consumption decision of the entrepreneur himself. In other words, the profit-maximizing production plan of the firm will not be affected by the borrowing/lending decisions of its owners, i.e. the production plan is independent of the financing decision.
